Roberta Rice Replies to Brad DeLong

Now a really really tough one. I will try to reply to Brad Delong's questions for Condoleezza Rice.
To make it clear that I don't believe what I am typing I will refer to myself as Roberta Rice.



JBD: You stated that the proposals for attacking Al Qaeda that Richard Clarke submitted to you in January 2001 were a "laundry list," and that it took eight months of work to turn that "laundry list" into a coherent plan. Isn't that claim false? Wasn't the plan the NSC Principals discussed on September 4 in its essentials the same plan that Richard Clarke had proposed on January 25?

RR: I think your question puts a whole lot of stress on the distinction between a ?laundry list? and a ?list?. I am indeed sorry that I added the word ?laundry? to that which Richard Clarke calls a ?list?. Richard Clarke did present me with a long list of anti al Qaeda policy options drawing on the unique experience which was one of the reasons we kept him, the energy which was another reason and the intelligence which was a third reason. Being a civil servant, Richard Clarke would never imagine presenting the National Security Advisor with a take it or leave it offer. Rather he suggested we consider doing this, that and/or the other thing. It is true that, in the event, before 9/11, we decided to adopt each and every proposal on the list. This was not an easy choice as many of the proposals implied costs and risks. However, we decided that the threat from al Qaeda was so urgent that we should fight al Qaeda in every way we could imagine.

JBD: In retrospect, don't you deeply regret that you did not give Richard Clarke the NSC Principals meeting he asked for at the very start of the administration?

RR: I don?t see how a big meeting would have made a big difference. I don?t think meetings are the way to fight terrorism. I thought it was best to discuss the policy options one on one with the president [thinks: that would be in a setting with no agenda, transcript or minutes so unless George rats on me I won?t go to the slammer].

JBD: Why have you worked so hard to exaggerate the differences between what Clarke proposed on January 25 and what the NSC Principals discussed on September 4?

RR: I don?t think I have exaggerated anything. I have tried to give this commission and the American people an accurate picture of Bush administration policy and policy deliberations.

JBD: Do you regret requiring that Richard Clarke report to the NSC Deputies committee rather than chairing the NSC Principals committee? Didn't this greatly slow down policy development? Wouldn't things have been better if you had let Clarke do what he wanted to do--play the same role he played in the Clinton administration?

RR: Although he didn?t say anything to me the first time I discussed NSC organization with him in my new capacity of NSA designate, I?m sure Richard Clarke would have liked to have effective cabinet rank without Senate approval. A lot of people would like to have effective cabinet rank. I think that perceived favoritism and unfairness could impair the proper functioning of the NSC. In fact, I am fairly sure that Richard Clarke agreed that he would have to win the new principals? respect and admiration in order to, well, to be frank, boss them around as he had the Clinton administration principals. I think that is why he gave no hint of disagreement when I described how I planned to have the NSC operate as it had when we both worked for it.

JBD: What benefit was gained from forcing Richard Clarke to jump through bureaucratic hoops set for him by people like Wolfowitz who believed that Saddam Hussein was a much more important foreign policy concern than Osama bin Laden?

RR: I don?t think that Paul thought that Saddam Hussein was a more important policy concern than Osama bin Laden. He thought and thinks that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were working together to forward their common aim of destroying the United States of America.
[obviously Brad would follow this up too. Roberta Rice hopes that the discussion will never get back from a debate about an issue on which most Americans agree with her]

JBD: You have stated that in the summer of 2001 the Bush administration was at "battle stations". When the Clinton administration was at battle stations in the run-up to January 1, 2000, the NSC staff led by Richard Clarke shook the trees by having daily cabinet-level meetings on the terrorist threat, and demanding that cabinet officers probe deeply into their organizations looking for important but unrecognized information. There was no corresponding effort in the summer of 2001, was there?

RR: which secretaries did you have in mind ?

JBD: Freeh and Tenet.

RR: oh you mean cabinet level officers. Well since, as Richard Clarke has explained, George Tenet was as alarmed as he was and was telling the president about the al Qaeda threat every day. I don?t see how a daily cabinet level meeting could possibly have made George shake the trees any more than he was already shaking them. The only effect I see is that he would have less time to search for leads. You will, I think, have noticed from Richard Clarke?s book, that he and Louis Freeh didn?t work together very well. We thought it better for them to work separately.

JBD: When you say that the Bush administration was at "battle stations" before 911, aren't you misleading people who know what Richard Clarke's idea of "battle stations" is?

RR: Richard Clarke doesn?t have the copyright on the phrase battle stations. It should be clear that such a brief and metaphorical description of the posture of the Bush administration could not be precise and definitive. If you have a question as to what we were doing to protect the homeland from al Qaeda, I would be delighted to answer it.

JBD: Do you regret not giving Richard Clarke the authority in the summer of 2001 to do what he wanted to do--to "shake the trees" of the departments in an attempt to uncover information of unrecognized importance?

RR: Not at all for the reasons I have just explained.

JBD: Richard Cheney has claimed that before September 11, 2001, Richard Clarke was "out of the loop" on important counterterrorism matters. What important matters relevant to counterterrorism was Richard Clarke--the administration's counterterrorism coordinator--not informed of before September 11?

RR: You are referring to the interview in which VP Cheney said ?Well, he wasn't in the loop frankly on a lot of this stuff?. Frankly I don?t know what stuff VP Cheney had in mind. I think you will notice that VP Cheney was speaking informally. I guess he was thinking of policy implemented after Richard Clarke shifted to cybersecurity in October 2001, but you will have to ask VP Cheney if you want to be sure.

JBD possible follow up which doesn't follow: Whose policy decision was it that the counterterrorism coordinator would not be allowed to coordinate--would not be informed of--important aspects of counterterrorism?

JBD possible follow up which doesn't follow: Wasn't this keeping the counterterrorism coordinator from having the information he needed to do his job a really stupid idea?


JBD: [So you are saying that Richard Cheney is not trustworthy?

RR: I?m just saying that before you read all sorts of strange interpretations into the transcript something he casually said off the cuff when talking to Rush Limbaugh, you might ask him what he meant. I think that VP Cheney was saying something perfectly reasonable, which is entirely consistent with the fact that Richard Clarke was coordinating anti terrorism policy until he stopped be counterterrorism coordinator. Still if is so important to you to know, ask VP Cheney when he is here
[thinks: in private and not under oath trying to run out the clock before you get the president to show what an ignorant extremist he is]

JBD: Richard Clarke's counterterrorism proposals were taken to the NSC Principals on September 4, 2001. But isn't it correct that there was no agreement on how to fund Clarke's proposals reached at that meeting?

RR: as you know Congress appropriates funds. It is true that there wasn?t a specific budget proposal to fund the, as yet unsigned, NPDS. This is one of the things which it has in common with every NPDS ever signed.

JBD: When--if 9/11 had not happened--would the next NSC Principals' meeting on this issue have been scheduled?

RR: It?s hard to answer a hypothetical question. We don?t schedule very far in advance. I would guess roughly September 17th.

JBD: In May 2001, George W. Bush asked for a plan to destroy Al Qaeda. Richard Clarke told you he could have such a plan ready on two days. Was there any reason not to rapidly satisfy Bush's request?

RR: ?on two days? ? Don?t you mean in two days ?

JBD: yes.

RR: I?m sorry I don?t remember exactly what Richard Clarke told me that day [thinks:in our unscheduled conversation with no transcript so no way you can nail me]. I vaguely recall that he said something like ?If you would just get Wolfowitz to shut up and let me handle it, I could get a plan ready in two days?. I didn?t think that me transmitting Richard Clarkes instructions to shut up to Paul Wolfowitz would really have speeded the policy development process. When working with former diplomats like Clarke and Wolfowitz one has to be uhm diplomatic.

[thinks: Wolfowitz shut up has a nice ring to it. Wolfowitz shut up. Wolfowitz shut up. Wolfowitz shut up and move to Baghdad]

JBD: Why does George W. Bush believe that Saddam Hussein played a role in the attacks of September 11, 2001?
[this Q is checkmate by the way. Rice has to argue that Bush did not insist that Saddam Hussein played a role in 9/11, but she also must not shake the irrational faith of roughly half of America that Saddam Hussein did play such a role. If those Americans get over that irrational belief, Bush will not be re-elected, because his decision to invade Iraq will no longer seem defensible to them. I'd say the strategy for a partisan dem on the committee is to basically spend all of his (or her) time asking this question in various wordings, or maybe alternate it with do you think that shaking the trees as the Clinton administration didn in 1999 might have made the fact that (Massaoui had been arrested) fall into your hands, with all the things we wish Riceknew in parentheses ]

RR: President Bush wanted and wants to make sure that the intelligence community explore every possibility. President Bush knew that the CIA did not believe there was a connection. President Bush believes that one should never assume that one is right but should always be willing to reconsider one?s conclusions in the light of new facts.
Mr commissioner I don?t want to complain, but it is hard for me to concentrate on my testimony while you are rolling on the floor laughing.

JBD: Did you attempt to disabuse George W. Bush of this belief?

RR: What belief ? I did not try to convince president Bush that I know all the answers and that further investigation is pointless -- no.

JBD: Why not?

RR: I guess, mostly because I don?t think I know all the answers.

JBD: George W. Bush's belief that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 911 has had important consequences. In early 2002, to prepare for the war in Iraq, important elite American combat units were withdrawn from Afghanistan. Didn't this have a significant impact retarding out hunt for members of Al Qaeda?

RR: I don?t know why you interpret President Bush?s open mindedness about a possibility as a firm belief.
Would you please at least try to laugh a little less loud Mr Commissioner.

JBD: If these units weren't important, why were they sent to Afghanistan in the first place?

RR: They played a very important role in the astonishingly quick defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afganistan. When almost all Arabic speakers in Afganistan had either been arrested (look in Guantanamo) or screened and found to be genuine humanitarian aid workers (0 of them) Donald Rumsfeld felt that there was no vital reason to keep Arabic speaking special forces in Afganistan. Paul Wolfowitz agreed
[thinks: Baghdad Wolfie I?ll visit you in Baghdad]

JBD: Aren't the steps we are taking now along the Afghan-Pakistan border steps that we should have taken in the spring of 2002--steps that we would have taken in spring 2002 if not for the administration's focus on Iraq?

RR: Pakistan is a vital ally in the war against terror. You have to understand the sort of pressure president Musharraf is under. Remember he has survived two assassination attempts recently. Given the extremely delicate political situation in Pakistan, and the long standing legal status of the semi independent Northern territories, it required a long diplomatic effort to coordinate US and Pakistani offensives on both sides of the border. It would have served no purpose for us to chase the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists into Pakistan. For the reasons I have mentioned, the hammer and anvil strategy could not have been implemented earlier.